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Journal Articles European Journal of the History of Economic Thought Year : 2005

Why Rationality May Be a Consequence of Hume's Theory of Choice

Abstract

Facing R. Sugden's criticism of our interpretation, it is shown in this paper that rationality appears as a possible consequence of Hume's theory of choice. We first argue that Sugden's dismissal of the preference relation from the type of rationality through which Hume's theory is apprehended, is highly disputable, from the point of view of both standard choice theory and Hume's theory of passions. Nonetheless, Sugden's criterion of rationality might be restated in Humean terms as a condition of non-revision of preferences in the dynamics of passions. But, since the process of choice that we have described explicitly takes into account the revision of preferences, and shows that, when this last is no longer required, rationality occurs as an outcome of this process, it is not really concerned by Sugden's criticism.
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Dates and versions

hal-00343872 , version 1 (02-12-2008)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00343872 , version 1

Cite

Marc-Arthur Diaye, André Lapidus. Why Rationality May Be a Consequence of Hume's Theory of Choice. European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2005, 12 (1), pp.119-126. ⟨hal-00343872⟩
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