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Autre Publication Scientifique Documents de travail du Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne Année : 2024

Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds

Résumé

Does pre-voting group deliberation improve majority outcomes? To address this question, we develop a probabilistic model of opinion formation and deliberation. Two new jury theorems, one pre-deliberation and one post-deliberation, suggest that deliberation is beneficial. Successful deliberation mitigates three voting failures: (1) overcounting widespread evidence, (2) neglecting evidential inequality, and (3) neglecting evidential complementarity. Formal results and simulations confirm this. But we identify four systematic exceptions where deliberation reduces majority competence, always by increasing Failure 1. Our analysis recommends deliberation that is 'participatory', 'neutral', but not necessarily 'equal', i.e., that involves substantive sharing, privileges no evidences, but might privilege some persons.
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Dates et versions

halshs-03667931 , version 1 (13-05-2022)
halshs-03667931 , version 2 (19-01-2024)
halshs-03667931 , version 3 (02-07-2024)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-03667931 , version 3

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Franz Dietrich, Kai Spiekermann. Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds. 2024. ⟨halshs-03667931v3⟩
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